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Prosecution Need Not Immunize Defense Witness.-Earl v. United States, 361 F. 2d 531 (D.C.
Cir. 1966). Defendant was convicted of narcotic
offenses and appealed on the ground that it was
error for the trial judge to refuse to compel the
government to grant immunity to a defense witness
who had claimed his privilege against self-incrimination when called to testify. The court of
appeals declined to so hold and affirmed the
conviction.
Defendant was accused of being an accessory
to the sale of narcotics by one Scott. The charge
against Scott was dropped by the government in
return for his plea of guilty to other offenses, but
when he was called by the defense to testify in
exculpation of the defendant he refused on the
ground that his testimony might incriminate him.
His refusal was upheld by the trial court.
The defense then contended that if Scott were
given immunity, and forced to testify, he would
testify that appellant was not his partner in crime.
The trial court refused to compel the government
to grant immunity to Scott. In affirming this
refusal, the court said:
"What Appellant asks this Court to do is
command the Executive Branch of government
to exercise the statutory power of the Executive
to grant immunity in order to secure relevant
testimony. This power is not inherent in the
Executive and surely is not inherent in the
judiciary. * ** The Government does not suggest that Congress could not provide for a
procedure giving a defendant a comparable right
to compel testimony, but only that Congress
has not done so. Whatever the merits of the
arguments in favor of such a procedure, it is
obvious that it would require safeguards to
preclude abuses; the complexity and difficulty
of evaluating the impact of that course suggest
at once the inadequacy of the facilities available
to the judiciary to make the assessment. We
conclude that the judicial creation of a pro-

cedure comparable to that enacted by Congress
for the benefit of the Government is beyond
our power."
The court warned, however, that a different case
would be presented if the government had granted
immunity to one of its witnesses and had, at the
same time, refused to grant similar immunity to a
defense witness. "That situation", said the court,
"would vividly dramatize an argument on behalf
of Earl that the immunity statute as applied denied
him due process."
Included Offense Will Not Support Felony
Murder Charge-State v. Branch, 415 P.2d 766
(Ore. 1966). Defendant was convicted of murder
in the second degree after a trial in which he was
charged with murder in the first degree. At the
trial, the court gave a prosecution instruction to
the jury charging that malice need not be proved
if they found that defendant had killed his victim
while engaged in the commission of a felony. The
defendant objected to this charge on the ground
that the evidence did not show that he had committed any collateral felony at the time he killed
the deceased. The prosecution replied that the
felony which supported the felony-murder instruction was the offense of assault with a dangerous weapon which was an itcluded offense under
the charge of murder.
In reversing defendant's conviction, the Oregon
Supreme Court refused to establish a rule that a
felony-murder charge could be prosecuted when the
felony involved was a lesser included, rather than
a collateral, offense. "In order to preserve the
distinctions between the degrees of murder and
manslaughter," the court said, "courts in other
states have held that where the only felony committed (apart from the murder itself) was the
assault upon the victim which resulted in the
death of the victim, the assault merged with the
killing and could not be relied upon by the state
as an ingredient of a 'felony murder.'"
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Voice Identification Violates Due ProcessPalmer v. Peytwn, 359 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1966).
After three trials (the first ending in mistrial and
the second in a hung jury), defendant was convicted of rape. Aside from testimony of a neighbor
that Palmer had confessed the rape "of a white
woman", the only testimony linking defendant to
the crime came from the complainant who said
that she recognized his voice as he conversed with
the sheriff in another room. Holding that the voice
identification made in the sheriff's office was not,
because of the circumstances under which it was
taken, the result of "an objective, impartial judgment by the prosecutrix", the court found that its
admission into evidence violated the due process
clause and reversed the state court judgment.
On the evening of the day on which the offense
had occurred, the prosecutrix had witnessed a
lineup of four or five Negro suspects, but failed to
identify the voices of any. When defendant was
taken into custody the next day (on the word of
a man who had himself been a suspect), he was
made to repeat phrases used by the criminal, but
no voices (except that of the sheriff) were part of
the conversation for comparison purposes. The
victim did not see defendant in the station to
corroborate her identification by noting his weight,
height, color or other features. She had been told
that a suspect was in custody and had been shown
his shirt which resembled that worn by her attacker.
In condemning the identification as unconstitutional, the court noted that "Any identification
process ... involves danger that the percipient
may be influenced by prior formed attitudes...
[and] where the witness bases the identification on
only part of the suspect's total personality, such
as ...voice alone, prior suggestions will have

most fertile soil in which to grow to conviction.
This is especially so when the identifier is presented
with no alternative choices; there is then a strong
predisposition to overcome doubts and to fasten
guilt upon the lone suspect."
Criminal Discovery Reviewed In New JerseyState v. Tate, 221 A.2d 12 (N.J. 1966). Defendant,
under indictment for felony murder, sought to
interview prosecution witnesses who had been at
the scene of the crime. Though the State voiced no
objection, the witnesses declined to be interviewed.
Defendant then sought a pre-trial order from the
court "permitting him to take their depositions in
advance of trial, solely for the purpose of dis-

covery. The trial court denied the motion and
[the Supreme Court of New Jersey] granted defendant leave to appeal."
In affirming the ruling of the trial court, the
supreme court noted that the only pre-trial discovery procedures allowed by rule were those in
cases where the defendant feared that a material
witness would not be available at trial, In this
case, said the court, "Defendant disavows that
need, and seeks pretrial disclosure solely to learn
what the witnesses know." Though the defendant
argued that state and federal constitutional provisions compel such discovery, the court found
that no cases had so held and that under current
practise a good deal of discovery was permissible
in other ways, e.g., a bill of particulars, requesting
a defendant's own statement to the grand jury or
the police, obtaining prior statements of state
witnesses after their direct testimony.
"Further", the court said, "the State represents
that it will produce all of [the persons sought to
be interviewed] as witnesses, thus relieving defendant of his fear that one or more may not
appear and that thereby testimony useful to the
defense will be lost. In this regard, the prosecutor
acknowledges his heavy ethical duty to produce at
the trial, or to disclose to the defense before trial
and sufficiently so to be meaningful, any information in his file helpful to the accused. In these
circumstances, we see no constitutional difficulty."
The court concluded by saying that:
"The question whether our rules should nonetheless be amended to permit discovery by
deposition in criminal cases is another matter.
No doubt the defendant in a criminal case, especially one who had no prior relation with the
victim of the offense, has little practical opportunity to investigate. By the time he is charged
and a private investigator retained, the scene
has changed, and trails, if there were any, have
been obliterated. * * *
Perhaps the investigatorial arms of government should be deemed the impartial servants
of the defense as well as the prosecution, with
the work product available to both, subject
only to such restrictions as the personal security
of a witness may demand. In a sense that proposition would be but an extension of the settled
view that the prosecution must seek only a just
result, and that the duty is the State's to produce or offer to the defendant whatever it has
that could help him. To open the State's file
before trial would have the virtue of relieving
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the prosecutor of the burden of deciding correctly what should be revealed in obedience to
this ethical obligation. Further, the defense may
see significance in facts which to the prosecutor
are but neutral. Again, if the public investigatorial services were the impartial servants of
both the prosecution and the defense, there
could be saved the cost of individual investigations which we may assume will continue to
mount more and more as indigent defendants
ask for private investigators at public expense.
Finally, there is the related question whether
the State's file should be opened only on the
reciprocal condition that the defendant reveal
his defense and the identity of his witnesses."
Finally, the court decided that it had no experience of its own, or of other states', to draw upon
in deciding whether to allow discovery in criminal
cases, and that resolution of this broad policy question was inappropriate within the confines of a
single case. The court held that "The topic can be
explored more satisfactorily in the rule-making
process at hearings open to all who might contribute to a solution" and to that end scheduled
public hearings on the issue.
Seizure of Clothing After Arrest PermissibleGolliher v. United States, 362 F.2d 594 (8th Cir.
1966). Convicted of unlawfully entering a federally
insured bank, defendants appealed on the ground,
inter alia, that their clothing had been unlawfully
seized from them after arrest and subjected to
microscopic examination which disclosed evidence
of their guilt. The argument was rejected by the
Court of Appeals and the conviction was affirmed.
Defendants contended that their clothes were
"purely evidentiary in character, and, therefore,
inadmissible under the doctrine of Gouled v.
United States, [255 U.S. 298 (1921).]" The Court
of Appeals distinguished Gouled, however, on the
ground that that case did not involve a search of
the person and that "at no time has the Supreme
Court ruled that search for and seizure of evidence
directly under the control of a validly arrested
person is unconstitutional."
"There is a very narrow and hazy line between
the instrumentalitites used in the commission of a
crime and pure evidence," the court found, and
noted that some state courts have "bravely announced that searches for evidence are proper
regardless of where they took place as long as
they were otherwise reasonable". While the court
indicated sympathy with this viewpoint, it felt
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that it was bound by decisions such as Gouled
not to go that far. Instead, it adoped a middle
course:
"However, we do not feel that we have been
foreclosed from holding that evidence directly
and intimately connected with the crime for
which an accused is arrested and is actually on
the person of the accused at the time of his
arrest is subject to search and seizure incident
to his lawful arrest. *** In such a situation
the accused is already subject to a general
search incident to his arrest for such things as
weapons, instrumentalities, and fruits of the
crime. Therefore, it is not a question of whether
or not we shall allow a search, for the search
already has the sanction of the law. It is only a
question of whether evidence may be seized
during the search. * * * We first note that scientific examination of dust particles, paint chips,
blood stains, etc., is a widespread and necessary
part of scientific police investigation. Were we
to deny enforcement officials the right to gather
this evidence from an accused actually in custody, a necessary weapon in the arsenal of
detection would be largely destroyed. In recent
years the Supreme Court has announced Constitutional principles that necessarily deemphasize the use of interrogation, and, at the same
time, supposedly encourage scientific investigation. *** As a practical matter we cannot
possibly insist that enforcement officials rely
upon scientific investigation and at the same
time deny them an integral part of this scientific
potential. * * * Were we to uphold appellants
in this case the bloody shirt worn into the
police station by the murder suspect would be
kept from the eyes of the jury. To us this would
be deplorable folly."
No Probable Cause Needed For Stop and
Question-Wilson v. Porter, 361 F.2d 412 (9th
Cir. 1966). Defendant, convicted in a state court
for unlawful possession of weapons, was granted a
writ of habeas corpus by a federal district court on
the ground that the search and seizure which
disclosed the weapons was unconstitutional. On
appeal of the warden, the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit reversed.
Traffic officers in Ontario, California noticed
defendant's car go by them in a westbound direction at about 3: 00 A.M. About 25 minutes later,
the officers again observed the car, still going in a
westerly direction, about nine blocks further
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down the same street. After following the car a
short distance, the police turned on their "Mars"
light to signal the driver to pull over to the curb.
Immediately, one of the passengers slid down on
the seat as though placing an object under the
seat. The car stopped at the curb, defendant
alighted and was asked for identification.
At this point, no traffic laws had been violated.
Defendant's passenger was also requested by the
police to get out of the car and produce identification. As he did so, the officer shined a flashlight
into the car and observed what he believed to be
a gun barrel protruding from under the seat. A .22
caliber pistol was found and, after defendant's
arrest, a dagger was found in the search of his
pockets at the police station.
While refusing to characterize the initial stop of
the automobile as an "arrest" or a "detention",
the district court ordered defendant's release
because "driving an automobile in the pre-dawn
hours--that and nothing more-provides justification neither for arrest nor for detention.., and
the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures makes no distinction between
detention without cause and arrest without cause."
In reversing, the court of appeals held that
"While it is clear that at the time appellee's car
was pulled over probable cause for an arrest did
not exist, it is also clear that not every time an
officer sounds his siren or flashes a light to flag
down a vehicle has an arrest been made. The
initial act of stopping appellee's car was not an
arrest."
It was not enough, said the court, merely to
conclude that the constitution "makes no distinction between informal detention without cause
and formal arrest without cause". The true answer
the court said, is that "there is a difference between that 'cause' which will justify informal
detention short of arrest and the probable cause
standard required to justify that kind of custody
traditionally denominated an arrest. Our concern
here is what degree of cause will justify cursory,
informal detention in circumstances which would
not justify an arrest, and whether the officers
met that standard in the particular circumstances
of this case."
The "degree of cause" necessary to justify
"informal detention" was then characterized by
the court as "a founded suspicion", i.e., "some
basis from which the court can determine that
the detention was not arbitrary and harassing",
even as little as "the instinctive reaction of one

trained in the prevention of crime." The court
then concluded that the facts of this case were
sufficient to meet that standard. "We cannot say
that the circumstances of a car making inordinately slow progress along a street in the small
hours of the morning could not reasonably have
aroused the suspicions of a local officer alert to
the unusual within his beat, and lead him to
investigate."
Double Jeopardy And A Defendant's AppealState v. Barger, 220 A.2d 304 (Md. 1966). Indicted
for murder, defendant was acquitted of the first
degree offense, but found guilty of murder in the
second degree. He appealed and the conviction was
reversed on the ground that the jury had been
misdirected. At the second trial, the prosecution
announced its intention to reprosecute for the
crimes charged originally, including the first degree
charge of which defendant had been acquitted.
Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on
the ground of double jeopardy and the trial court
dismissed the first degree charge. The State appealed and the ruling was affirmed.
The position of the State was that "where the
accused appeals a prior conviction the granting of
a new trial nullifies the entire first trial and permits
a retrial of the accused on the offenses of which
he was found not guilty as well as those of which
he was formerly acquitted." (Emphasis added.)
In rejecting this argument, the court characterized it as unreasonable "(a) because to hold that
the appeal and consequent granting of a new trial
constituted a waiver would be inconsistent with
the fact that the defendant sought only to reverse
so much of the verdict as supported his conviction
of second degree murder and (b) because the
opening of the whole case for reconsideration
would place too great a price on the right of an
accused to appeal."
In dissent, judge Barnes pointed out that the
State had argued that "its inability to try the
defendant at the new trial for murder in the first
degree would gravely handicap the State in the
prosecution of this case". And, referring to his
fear that the majority felt compelled to reverse
because of what the Supreme Court might hold in
the future, he said "I have seen no studies which
attempt to show what effect [the Supreme Court's
recent decisions] may have had upon the extiaordinary increase in crime in the United States,
but if the certainty of apprehension, conviction
and punishment of criminals acts as a deterrent to

